Why doesn't more capital ‡ow to developing countries as predicted by the neoclassical model? Is the explanation simply that the cross-country marginal product of capital (MPK) is equalized, and if so, why? We revisit these issues by unpacking MPK measurement into public and private, since there is good reason to believe that the process of MPK determination is enormously di¤erent across the two sectors, especially in developing countries. We do so by calculating MPK schedules across the two sectors, for a large sample of advanced and developing countries. The key …ndings are as follows: the overall MPK across countries is slightly upward sloping. Disaggregation suggests that the positive slope is driven by the public sector -we …nd the public MPK to be upward sloping but the private MPK to be ‡at. We interpret this as the result of overinvestment and ine¢ ciencies within the governments of developing countries -put another way, governments are not pro…t-maximizers in the The authors thank
Introduction
The Lucas paradox is a focal point for many big picture issues in development;
whether the e¢ cacy of aid, the extent of international capital market frictions, or the importance of institutions and complementary factors. Lucas (1990) stated the paradox as follows: if capital-labor ratios are so low in poor countries and thus returns high as the standard one-sector growth model predicts, why doesn't more capital ‡ow from rich to poor countries?
The paradox pre-supposes a downward-sloping …nancial return to investment in the cross-section of nations. Intuitively, there are only a small set of possible explanations: (i) either the return has been mis-measured, and it is not actually downwardsloping; (ii) the return is downward-sloping but capital movement is restricted by capital market imperfections; or (iii) investors in some way defy standard theories of pro…t maximization (e.g. there is some home bias which permits returns di¤erentials to persist). Lucas himself posited that the explanation could be that of failing to account for complementary factors to physical capital, such as human capital, resulting in an overstating of the MPK. Lucas placed little credence on the argument of capital market frictions.
The MPK is the most common measure employed to approximate the return to investment, in an attempt to resolve the paradox. Unfortunately estimating the MPK is no easy task. Several approaches exist: among them, comparison of interest rates across countries, production function estimation, and calibration. 1 Caselli and Feyrer (2007) (CF from hereafter) argue that these approaches have collectively failed at producing reliable and comparable estimates of the cross-country MPK. 2 In a
persuasive, yet provocative, contribution to the literature, they present the case for direct MPK estimation using easily accessible macroeconomic data. 3 Their approach assumes competitive markets and imposes no restrictions on production functions other than that of constant returns to scale.
CF's main contribution is that they derive a MPK measure that is more suitable for the purpose of international credit ‡ows. The standard MPK derived from the one-sector growth model is not a good measure of capital returns because it provides output per unit of physical capital invested. Multisector models imply that the …nan-cial return to investment is better proxied as output per unit of output invested. By making two reasonable adjustments to a naïve measure of the MPK, Lucas Paradox resolved, CF …nd that the cross-country MPK is roughly ‡at.
In this paper, we give a more nuanced analysis along one dimension: that of sectoral returns, distinguishing between the public and private MPK. 4 The private and public distinction is important for a host of reasons. Foremost amongst these is that the theory behind MPK determination is likely to di¤er signi…cantly between the two sectors. There is much literature elsewhere with results that hinge on the contrasting behavioral idiosyncrasies of public and private agents (e.g., Becker (1957) , Fama (1980) , Besley and Burgess (2002) , Robinson and Torvik (2005) ). 5 The empirical evidence in Keefer and Knack (2007) is also consistent with the notion of governments as non-maximizers. To be consistent with MPK equalization, public investment should be highest where the returns are highest. Keefer and Knack …nd instead that public investment is dramatically higher in countries with low-quality governance and limited political checks and balances. Their interpretation of this result is that governments use public investment as a means for rent-seeking. If the public sector maximizes a wholly di¤erent objective function to the private sector, capital allocation and the resultant MPK should be determined di¤erently.
Second, the private and public sector tend to make di¤erent types of investment.
The public sector tends to invest where markets fail: where social returns exceed private returns, where the capital is non-rivalrous and non-excludable and where high …xed costs make a natural monopoly a strong possibility. In short, public and pri- 4 This within-country heterogeneity in returns is, for example, a key theme in Banerjee and Du ‡o (2005). 5 Robinson and Torvik (2005) , for example, aim to explain why governments don't act like pro…t maximizers when it comes to investing. In particular, the model explains the political motivation behind the construction of white elephants. Politicians construct these ine¢ cient projects when they …nd it di¢ cult to make credible promises to political supporters. The general point of this and other political economy models is that governments are driven more by an electoral motive than by a pro…t motive. vate capital should be considered imperfectly substitutable in a country's production function. In this sense, the overall MPK is misleading, whilst the private and public MPK are more informative.
Third, following Pritchett (2000) , the separation between public and private capital is warranted in light of public investment ine¢ ciency. As Pritchett emphasizes, there is no plausible behavioral model by which we would expect public investment to be e¢ cient in the same way that might be expected of private investment. Caselli (2005) echoes this sentiment and argues for the future separation of public and private investment, when appropriate data comes available, in the context of development accounting. In this paper, we use data that makes this separation possible. Pritchett (2000) and Caselli (2005) , among others, thought that data issues would make it near impossible to convincingly estimate the private and public MPK. One main contribution of this paper is to break the impasse and carry out this exercise for the …rst time. To do this, we employ improved data on the sectoral share of investment from IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO). This data permits us to estimate the private and public MPK for a broad sample of advanced and developing countries.
We …nd that the overall MPK is slightly upward sloping, with this result driven by public sector investment behavior. After disaggregating, we …nd the private MPK to be ‡at and the public MPK to be upward-sloping. Our results point to the importance of public sector ine¢ ciencies and political factors (rather than economic returns) driving public investment across countries. This distinct behavior of the public sector promotes new explanations of the Lucas Paradox.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 takes a close look at the primary sources of the data used to disaggregate total capital into its public and private components and discusses the steps followed to calculate the public and private MPK. Section 3 presents and discusses the main results of the paper. Section 4 extends the main analysis in two directions: by incorporating ine¢ ciencies in the measurement of MPK, and by examining the e¤ects of allowing for public and private capital in a two-sector neoclassical growth model. Section 5 concludes.
Data
In this section we show in detail the steps followed to construct the public and private marginal product of capital. The relevant price-corrected MPKs are as follows:
where and denote the shares of private and public capital in income, respectively. Our core sample comprises …fty developing and developed countries with public, private and overall MPK data in 2006. 6 We also look at time series data from 1990, with the sample size beginning at …fty-two, but falling to forty-eight across 1990-2009. As in CF, the main constraint on sample size is due to the need for data on the overall capital share from Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) .
We measure the cross-country private and public MPK using current price local currency data from World Development Indicators (WDI), rather than real data from Penn World Tables (PWT) adjusted for relative price di¤erences as in CF.
The use of current price local currency data is preferred here since it side-steps any reliance on PPP adjustments and extrapolated ICP data shown to be quite unstable for non-OECD countries (see Johnson et al. (2011) ). In addition, it has been argued elsewhere (e.g. Knowles (2001) ) that investment shares are more accurately measured using local price data, rather than data from PWT. In any case, the two approaches yield essentially the same results, as will be seen. The data we require are: income shares of public and private capital ( ; ), GDP in current price local currency (P y Y ), public capital (P k K g ) and private capital (P k K p ).
Current price local currency data on GDP and investment are taken from WDI.
In principle, each capital series could be obtained by using the perpetual inventory method on current price historic investment data, de ‡ated each year by a sectorspeci…c investment de ‡ator. In practice however, only a common investment de ‡ator exists. 7 In applying this common de ‡ator, we are constrained in identifying di¤erences 6 Though we have data for subsequent years until 2010 (sample sizes of 49, 49, 48 and 23 in 2007,  2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively) . 7 This investment de ‡ator is derived from WDI data as 100*(current price local currency gross …xed capital formation/constant price local currency gross …xed capital formation). Missing constant investment data is set equal to the product of constant price GDP and gross …xed capital formation as a proportion of GDP, for countries with available data.
in the relative price of capital faced by the public and private sector. But for the baseline estimation, the public and private MPK are adjusted by the same price ratio.
With current and constant price investment data, the next step is to split these investment ‡ows into their private and public sector constituents. This split is crucial as it drives the resultant di¤erences in the private and public MPK. To do this disaggregation, we use private investment share data from IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO), as was done in Gupta et al. (2011) . For the sample of …fty countries in 2006, the mean number of time series observations of the private investment share is thirty-three (ranging from a minimum of twelve to a maximum of forty-nine). 8 Before total investment is disaggregated, the …rst available observation of the private investment share is extrapolated back to the …rst year of investment data.
In the absence of any investment data at all prior to 1960, it is necessary to set initial conditions for both the public and private capital stocks. As is common practice (given the notion of a steady-state capital stock), we set the initial condition, K j0 , to I j0 =(g j + j0 ) where sector is indexed by j = p; g. I j0 is current price investment in the …rst year available, g j is the country-and sector-speci…c average growth rate of constant price investment over the …rst twenty years of available data, 9 j0 is the relevant depreciation rate for the …rst year of available investment data, with the pattern of depreciation rates taken from Gupta et al. (2011) . 10 Caselli (2005) shows that su¢ ciently recent capital measures tend to be insensitive to the exact assumptions made on these initial conditions. Armed with disaggregated investment and de ‡ator data, assumptions on initial conditions and a pattern of depreciation rates, we apply the perpetual inventory method to construct current price capital series for each country as follows: 8 For seven countries (Austria, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Jamaica and Sweden) investment share data was missing from the latest WEO. We opted to take the share data from WEO 2003, using forecasted shares for the years 2004-2008. 9 Since a negative g j could result in implausibly large or impossibly negative initial conditions, the measure was bounded at zero. For the core sample of …fty countries, this bounding only a¤ected the public capital initial condition for Zambia. 10 The depreciation rates employed in Gupta et al. (2011) are as follows (all 1960-2008) : (1) Public sector: 2.5% in LICs, 2.5% rising to 3.4% in MICs and 2.5% rising to 4.3% in Advanced; (2) Private sector: 4.25% in LICs, 4.25% rising to 7.6% in MICs, 4.25% rising to 9.6% in Advanced. We extrapolated the 2008 income-and sector-speci…c depreciation rates to 2009 and 2010. The underlying empirical and intuitive basis for this pattern of depreciation rates can be found in Arslanalp et al. (2010) .
so that
(1 )
The total capital stock is then simply set equal to the sum of the private and public stocks. Next, we take the composition of this reproducible capital share to be consistent with the results of columns (2) and (3) in Table 6 the income share of the associated factor input -provided that the identi…cation is credible. Still, we don't take the absolute coe¢ cients for our measurement since the aim is to maintain full country-speci…city of the reproducible capital share in income.
In addition to this, we place more credence on shares derived from national accounts 11 Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) (i.e. the relative income share of public capital is lower in richer countries). This is certainly an imperfect approach to measuring income shares since we fail to identify full heterogeneity in relative shares across countries, and even for the income groups, the regression estimates may be suspect if endogeneity problems persist. However, the results of Gollin (2002) provide at least some support that there is no systematic relationship between income levels and factor shares; that is the parameters of the aggregate production function are broadly similar across countries. If this is the case, assuming away full cross-country heterogeneity in relative public to private capital shares should not a¤ect our estimates substantively.
Public and Private MPK Calculations
With the necessary data at hand we turn to calculating each country's private and public MPK.
12 Table 1 presents baseline summary statistics for 2006, unless stated otherwise. 13 It is reassuring that the only di¤erence between our country sample and that of CF is the loss of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago due to a lack of updated investment data covering these countries. 12 In future work we will explore the sensitivity of the results to di¤erent assumptions regarding public investment e¢ ciency, factor shares and relative prices. 13 Ccode refers to each country's isocode, y is PPP Real GDP Per Worker from PWT 7, Sh# indicates the number of time series observations of sectoral investment shares, MPK(96) refers to CF's MPK measure for 1996 using PWT data. Next we attempt to reproduce CF's main results on the overall MPK using our baseline dataset. Let Y and P y be the quantity and price of …nal goods; K and P k the quantity and price of capital goods; w the share of reproducible plus natural capital; and k the share of reproducible capital. By construction, w > k . CF de…ne the following MPK measures:
M P KN is the naïve MPK, while M P KL adjusts the income share of capital to exclude natural capital, and P M P KN controls for the relative price of …nal goods to capital products. Finally, we arrive at the preferred measure, P M P KL, which incorporates natural-capital with relative-output-to-capital-price. Table 2 presents summary statistics of CF's four main MPK measures with increasing sophistication for 1996. CF argue on the basis of the …nal measure (PMPKL) that the MPK is essentially ‡at. The core analysis in the remainder of the paper focuses on shedding light on these intriguing results by turning attention to the distinction between private and public Figure 2 show that the public sector plays a disproportionately large role in investment in developing countries. 18 Therefore disaggregating the MPK into private and public may have important implications for the slope of the MPK.
As explained in Section 3, our approach is to measure the cross-country MPK (overall, public and private) using current price data on income and capital along with income share data. Using current price data, we can estimate the MPK schedule for the exact same sample as CF, for the year 1996. This exercise is performed in Figure   18 The relationship is ‡at when public investment as a percentage of GDP is considered because of two opposing forces: whilst public investment as a proportion of overall investment falls in income, investment as a proportion of GDP rises in income. In what follows, we focus on the distinction between the private and the public MPK. We can explore the prior that the theory of MPK equalization applies more to one sector than the other, and investigate whether the time-variation of the distinct MPKs di¤er.
Charts contained in Figure 4 show the public MPK (M P KG), its private counterpart (M P KP ), and their ratio (M P KG=M P KP ) for 1996 and 2006. Table 4 shows the summary statistics. The charts are noticeably di¤erent between the public and the private sector, …rst and second rows, respectively. The following observations can be made, both from the graphs and the descriptive statistics. First, there is greater variation in the public MPK. This indicates that the most signi…cant loss in world GDP may be due to the misallocation of public capital, not private capital. 19 Second, the public MPK is upward sloping whereas the private MPK is ‡at. The …tted lines for the M P KG measure (…rst row) are highly signi…cant, whereas the ones for the M P KP measure (second row) are insigni…cant. In fact, the evidence here suggests that it is the returns in the public sector which make CF's preferred MPK schedule upward sloping for rich and for developing countries. Once the public and private components of capital are separated, the return to investment relevant for markets, that is, the private MPK, suggest neither downward nor upward rigidities 19 To investigate this formally, it would be necessary to return to the approach of using real PPPadjusted data in order to construct capital stock data that is comparable across countries. This exercise will be left as a future extension. Third, there is an interesting pattern amongst the advanced economies: the private MPKs are extremely similar, the public MPKs are much more dispersed, and the mean public MPK is higher. According to this, the graphs potentially tell another story: private capital is allocated e¢ ciently in advanced economies, but ine¢ ciently in poor countries; public capital is allocated ine¢ ciently everywhere.
E¢ ciency requires not only that marginal returns are equalized across countries, but also across sectors. The ratio of the public to the private return, appearing in the third row of Figure 4 , gives information about how countries deviate from this cross-sector equalization. These results should be interpreted with care, however, as they depend, more than before, on correct assumptions made on income shares.
Still, the natural interpretation is that a ratio below one re ‡ects a government that overinvests in public capital, whereas a number above one suggests underinvestment. MPK is most likely due to technical change, whereas the divergence between the two MPKs can be due to several factors such as a decrease in the relative ine¢ ciency of the public sector and an increase in the private provision of public capital; further research is needed here.
The annual standard deviation of the MPK is more closely related to the concept of capital misallocation. In particular, a falling variation suggests more e¢ cient allocation of capital worldwide. The second row in Figure 5 shows that private capital is persistently allocated more e¢ ciently across countries than public capital -a result which may re ‡ect the purer pro…t-maximising incentives of private agents, and then diverged. For the developing world (middle panel), there is also divergence in underinvestment policies until 1996. Divergence can be due to technologies that require di¤erent private-to-public capital ratios, or to government policies; di¤erences in policy may be, for example, the result of di¤erent degrees of privatization.
Extensions
In this section we introduce two extensions to our baseline analysis. First, we try to correct public capital stocks for possible ine¢ ciencies in public investment by 
Incorporating ine¢ ciencies in public investment and capital formation
Pritchett (2000) and Caselli (2005) correctly argue that in many countries only a fraction of the actual accounting cost of investment passes into the value of the public capital stock. It is then the case that the public capital stock su¤ers from an upwards bias measurement problem when the perpetual inventory method is applied to past investment ‡ows. In our case that would imply that the MPK schedules could also be biased -perhaps the public MPK is not upward sloping after all. By overstating the public capital stock in developing countries where public investment e¢ ciency is lower, the public MPK is understated. Here we carry out an e¢ ciency adjustment to the public capital stock measures by using a newly constructed measure, the Public Investment Management Index (PIMI), as our ine¢ ciency proxy. This is the approach also taken in Gupta et al. (2011) where the overall PIMI score (averaged across its four sub-components) is normalized to lie between zero and one, and subsequently Table 5 suggest that the PIMI-adjusted public capital stock is a better proxy for actual public capital than the unadjusted measure. The unadjusted measure of public capital (as % of GDP) is only weakly positively correlated with infrastructure quantity and actually negatively correlated with quality. The PIMI-adjusted measure on the other hand has a fairly strong positive correlation with both. As shown in Dabla-Norris et al.
(2011), the PIMI possesses a lot of attractive features and is a good …rst proxy of public ine¢ ciencies; however, it is also only an ordinal measure. Subsequent results using this approach should therefore be interpreted with care.
To e¢ ciency-adjust the public capital stocks, we alter the method of Gupta et al. (2011) slightly by focusing only on the two components of the PIMI most closely related to investment e¢ ciency -project appraisal and selection. 21 These two components are summed for each country and normalized to lie between zero and one, resulting in a time-invariant e¢ ciency measure . The construction of the public capital stock becomes:
which (because of time-invariance) implies the straightforward adjustment 21 The other two components are implementation and evaluation.
Our assumptions here di¤er from Gupta et al. (2011) as in that paper they assume e¢ ciency equal to one prior to 1960 -in a sense, ine¢ ciency only 'kicks in'from the 1960s. Furthermore, we assume that e¢ ciency equals one in advanced economies, that is, their public capital stock is not adjusted. 22 To estimate the public MPK, we employ di¤erent estimates of the public capital income share from the regressions in Gupta et al. (2011) which use an e¢ ciency-adjusted measure 23 -this is their Table   6 , columns (5) and (6) . The private share in total capital income is assumed to be 0.66 in MICs and advanced economies; 0.68 in LICs. the price-corrected MPK re ‡ects well the returns to investment. Once we consider < 1, there is a disconnect between investment ‡ows and capital accumulation. The correct measure of the returns to public investment is now
which we call here M P IG, the marginal product of public investment. It is crucial to notice that Kt It depends only on e¢ ciency at time t, whereas
Yt Kt is a function of the full history of e¢ ciency (though with declining weight as we go further into the past). Under the assumptions of constant e¢ ciency and Cobb-Douglas technology, the M P IG is in fact identical to the un-adjusted M P KG (…rst row, Figure 6 ) -this comes as the result of an exact o¤set with cancelling out. Low historic e¢ ciency may imply a smaller capital stock today and a correspondingly higher M P KG (as we see in the second row of Figure 6 ), but this is o¤set by the low present-day public investment e¢ ciency. The exact o¤set is delivered with the assumption of Cobb- give some kind of o¤set. The purpose of all this is to show that the result of an upwardsloping return to public investment across countries is robust to the introduction of ine¢ ciency in public investment, provided the ine¢ ciency is either constant or at least that present-day e¢ ciency is a close proxy for 'historic e¢ ciency'. This proposition that the M P IG may be proxied reasonably by the M P KG has the added bene…t that the reader may remain skeptical of the value of adjusting capital stocks using the PIMI.
Even if the M P KG schedule is the most useful for understanding actual public investment returns, the eM P KG schedule may still have a useful interpretation. In some sense it hints at the returns to public investment possible if public investment e¢ ciency in developing countries was brought up to the level of advanced economies, even leaving the greater relative price of capital in developing countries unchanged.
From a policy perspective, there seem to be two implications for bringing public returns in developing countries in line with those in advanced economies: reform public investment e¢ ciency, and tackle the higher relative price of capital goods.
Returning to the adjusted public capital results, Figure 7 shows the time series dispersion exercise repeated with the addition of the e¢ ciency-adjusted public MPK, only for those countries with PIMI data, including advanced economies. The e¢ ciency adjustment gives no new meaningful time variation since the PIMI is time-invariant.
The interesting result is that the e¢ ciency adjustment does not overturn the initial observation that the variation in the public MPK is signi…cantly higher than the variation in the private MPK, as one might expect. The e¢ ciency-adjustment only reinforces this conclusion along with the …nding that the private MPK variance has fallen since the 1990s whilst the variance of the public MPK has not. can be behind it? We now present a simple framework that explore these issues.
In particular, it focus on ine¢ ciencies related to public capital prices. The model is close to the standard neoclassical multisector framework in CF, but contains more structure.
Production
Eliminate for simplicity time subcripts. The economy produces two …nal goods: a consumption product (Y c ), and an investment product or physical capital (Y m ). For that purpose, …rms in sector j employ private capital (K pj ), public capital (K gj ) and other factors (L j ) as inputs. The two goods are manufactured by the private sector under constant returns to scale and perfect competition according to
Input elasticities are such that ; 2 (0; 1) and + < 1. Employing results in
Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2008), we assume that both sectors display the same input intensities. The total factor productivity (TFP) parameters A c and A m are assumed to grow exogenously at rate g.
The idea behind expressions (7) and (8) is that the public and private sectors invest systematically in di¤erent types of capital. It seems reasonable then that private and public capital be considered complements in the production function.
In fact, there is some capital that the public sector is more willing to invest in;
historically, for example, the public sector has been instrumental in the provision of health, education and infrastructure investment in many nations.
Even though investment goods in the model are entirely supplied by the private sector, their production can be …nanced either by private agents to increase …rms' stocks or by the public sector to provide infrastructure to the economy. We also allow physical capital to come from both domestic production and imports (Y m ). All this implies the following feasibility contraint, and motion equations for capital:
The variables I p and I g represent private and public funds available for investment in physical capital, respectively. The capital stock K g = K gc +K gm , and
The coe¢ cient 2 (0; 1] is a measure of government ine¢ ciency in channeling funds to investment in line with Agénor (2010) , and is the depreciation rate.
Pro…t maximization in the two production sectors imply the following FOCs for capital and other inputs in sector j:
and
In these conditions, P c and P k represent the prices of the consumption good and the investment good, respectively; M P K pj and M P K gj in turn denote the marginal product of private and public capital in sector j, respectively. Firms pay an interest rate r to private savers for the capital borrowed, and a rate w to each unit of other inputs hired. The price is given by taxes and fees that private …rms perceived as being paid for the use of public infrastructure, like airport fees for example.
Expressions (12) to (14) can be expanded to obtain
From these FOCs, it can be shown that the capital-labor ratio needs to be equalized between sectors, the relative price of goods is exclusively pinned down by the relative TFP, and the private to public capital ratio depends on input elasticities and
where
The total amount of other resources L is assumed to grow at rate n. An important implication is that expression (20) suggest that relative output prices are only a¤ected by ine¢ ciencies related to the relative TFP.
MPK di¤erentials
Let P y Y be the economy's GDP, with the price P y representing the average price of …nal goods. Then
Expressions (7), (8), (18) to (20), (22) and (23) imply that
The price-corrected MPK measure constructed by CF (P M P KL) is just a weighted average across sectors. In terms of our model,
with K = K p + K g . The equality must hold for all j. Focusing on the consumptiongoods production activity, we can expand (26) using (18), (22) and (23) to obtain
Which employing the value of consumption-goods production implicit in (25) implies
Expression (27) provides a direct measure of the MPK that can be obtained using the physical capital share in income to approach + , GDP at domestic prices, and the capital stock at domestic prices. The key prediction of the multisector framework that CF exploit is that the …nancially-relevant MPK depends on the relative price of …nal-to-capital goods, P y =P k .
However, equality (27) holds only if capital is e¢ ciently allocated domestically.
To see this, notice that in our model with private and public capital, the …nancial return to investment (abstracting for simplicity from capital gains) is given by the price-corrected MPK for the private sector (M P KP ), r + in expression (12) . In particular, focusing again in the c sector,
Which from (21) to (23) become
Comparing P M P KL and M P KP , they di¤er because input prices play a role in the latter measure. In fact, when payments to both types of capital are the same, that is, the public sector charges a fee for the use of public infrastructure equal to the market return ( = r), the two measures coincide.
Public investment ine¢ ciency
These two inputs can, however, di¤er at least for two reasons. First, government's ine¢ ciency in investment, given by parameter . Second, the government may not be driven by pro…t maximization in public goods provision.
More speci…cally, we can write
For each unit invested, the public sector needs to collect taxes or borrow debt in an amount equal to 1= . As a consequence, a price equal to r= would be the pro…t-maximizing one, that is, the e¢ ciency-pricing one taking as given. But politicians might not be driven by pro…t maximization. They can charge then a price above or below r= . This is captured by coe¢ cient above, with > 0.
In the same manner, we can derive from expression (13) the following pricecorrected MPK for the pubic sector:
Again, if the price of both physical capital types coincide ( = r), their returns are equalized. Any discrepancy between measures (29) and (31) will signal ine¢ ciencies either related to pricing or related to investment channeling.
Expressions (29) to (31) imply that a lower degree of ine¢ ciency (higher ) and a higher degree of subsidization of public goods (smaller ) will reduce the privateto-public capital ratio and, as a consequence, tend to increase M P KP and decrease M P KG. Regarding the shape of M P KG with respect to income, if e¢ ciency pricing dominates, the M P KG should be downward sloping because poorer nations show lower values of the ine¢ ciency parameter . A upward sloping M P KG, on the other hand, will suggests that political considerations that lead to subsidization dominate.
Our results in Section 3 indicate that these political factors are the most important.
The e¤ects described in the last paragraph are partial equilibrium, since the overall capital stock is assumed to remain constant in expressions (29) and (31). Di¤erences between the price of the inputs, and the degree of ine¢ ciency in public investment can a¤ect the private and public capital stocks. To assess the impact of these general equilibrium e¤ects on M P KP and M P KG, we focus on the balanced growth path, assuming that the share of public investment is exogenous. Employing expressions (10), (15) , (21) and (30), it is standard to obtain that along the balanced growth
and M P KG = ( r + )
Therefore, identical qualitative e¤ects of remain as in partial equilibrium. So do the ones of as long as the depretiation rate is su¢ ciently small; otherwise higher levels of ine¢ ciency can increase or decrease the public and private MPK. Overall, a larger will decrease K g , which counteracts to some extent the partial equilibrium e¤ect, but will not completely neutralized them. Larger levels of public investment reduce both public and private returns. To summarize, the two-sector model suggests that the overall capital stock does not deliver the right MPK in the presence of public sector peculiarities. Output prices only counteract the impact of ine¢ ciencies related to the relative TFP. General equilibrium e¤ects that operate through the economy's stock of capital do not either neutralize them. The right measure for the …nancial return to investment is the one related to private capital. Di¤erences between this one and the MPK of public capital give us an idea of the degree of public sector ine¢ ciencies. Finally, both price-corrected MPKs, private and public, can be upward or downward sloping because of the public sector.
Conclusion
In their in ‡uential work Caselli and Feyrer (2007) In addition, we have pursued two extensions. We extended the analysis to incorporate a recently developed index of public investment management ine¢ ciency in our measurement of public capital. While our application of this index is certainly not ideal, modifying public capital for public investment ine¢ ciencies is hugely important as originally argued by Pritchett (2000) . Whilst the adjustment suggests a ‡at public MPK, we show that the measure of interest, the marginal product of investment, is still proxied well by the unadjusted MPK, provided public investment e¢ ciency is roughly constant. We also formalized the importance of relative prices and public sector ine¢ ciencies in the context of a two-sector neoclassical growth model. The model gives structure to our interpretation of the results -that of political factors driving the upward sloping MPK.
These …ndings lend a new set of explanations to the Lucas Paradox, placing public sector idiosyncrasies center stage. The data supports our intuition -public agents act di¤erently to private agents in the context of investment decisions. The result is a vastly di¤erent cross-country variation in the marginal product of capital across the two sectors. Our interpretation has emphasized the possibility of overinvestment by governments in developing countries facing few checks and balances and driven by an electoral motive. In contrast, the story we give is one of underinvestment in advanced economies -perhaps because of greater political pressure for a laissez-faire approach or due to inreasing private participation in typically public investment ventures. Still, the interpretation we suggest should be further explored.
Taking these claims seriously, there are important implications relating to the role of foreign aid in building capital stocks. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) gave a skeptical view on aid, concluding that greater ‡ows of aid will only be displaced by capital out ‡ows, given the ‡at MPK. Our disaggregation suggests a re…nement of this view. Based on our …ndings, the provision of foreign aid is not growth enhancing but could rather facilitate ine¢ cient overinvestment by the public sector, since aid is less accountable to returns than private sources of …nance. However, given imperfect substitutability between private and public capital in the production function, this overinvestment leads not to capital out ‡ows, but in ‡ows of private capital, since the greater stock of public capital raises the returns to private capital. Displacement aside, to raise the returns to aid for investment projects, the results suggest a renewed focus on improving public investment e¢ ciency and tackling the high relative cost of capital goods.
We started out on this research with one particular prior: that with careful measurement, the …nancial return to public capital would be found to be relatively high in developing countries re ‡ecting the large needs in education and infrastructure, to name a few. We were stunningly wrong. It may be …tting to close with a story of Tanzania's ability to attract foreign capital. Taking a walk in the busy streets of Dar es Salaam, the capital city, one is impressed by the vibrant private economic activity, entrepreneurship and the many bank branches (local and multinational) scattered across town. One gets the favorable impression that, although at embryonic stages, the private sector operates under close proximity to "market" conditions. A look at public goods (e.g. roads) and the provision of public services (e.g. power generation) signals clear de…ciencies. Experts correctly insist on the major progress, including in the public sector, that Tanzania has been through over the last two decades as captured by the country's seven percent average GDP growth. But by all accounts this progress is not sustainable unless capital starts to ‡ow inwards from abroad. This paper points to public sector frictions rather than …nancial frictions or complementarities to low human capital or TFP as the key constraint to enhancing the MPK and with it, accelerating international capital in ‡ows.
